

There is no difference between us, I am sure, so far as that objective is concerned. Our differences, really, are differences in the evaluation of objectives, differences in interpretation of the facts are, differences as to the best procedures to be followed to promote the common objective: The best welfare of the United States of America.

As a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, this is not a new position for me, so far as my attitude toward the foreign aid program is concerned.

I believe that the foreign aid program of the United States, at the present time, over all, is not in the best interests of future generations of Americans, nor is it in the best interests of the present generation of Americans.

As debate progresses, I shall advance—as I have in many years past, by bringing up to date the evidence which has been adduced since I last discussed those premises—my deep conviction that everywhere that foreign aid is being operated on the basis of its present format, American foreign aid is making hundreds of thousands of Communists around the world.

I shall advance the premise, and defend it, that American military aid, as it is being administered at present, jeopardizes peace, and that if it is peace which America seeks, drastic changes in American military aid should be enacted into law this year. They should have been enacted last year. They should have been enacted the year before that. They should have been enacted many years past, because I am satisfied that when the history of American military aid is written—after those of us in the Senate who will be voting on this bill are gone from the scene—future generations of Americans will be condemned with the course of action which we have followed in respect to American military aid.

Mr. President, before I enter into a discussion of the substance of some of the premises I have in mind, let me speak for a few moments about some procedures to be followed in connection with the debate. I particularly invite the attention of the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] with whom I have worked for many years to make foreign aid worth while.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. Does the Senator believe there is understanding on the part of the administration and others that our efforts through the years have been designed to improve and strengthened the administration of foreign aid, and that if some of the amendments that we propose were adopted, it would mean not only the saving of funds to the Treasury, but also the far more effective use of foreign aid, by which it would tend to achieve the objectives that are alleged for it, but which are being thwarted by its maladministration?

Mr. MORSE. I wish I could reply by saying that I believe the administration has that understanding, but the administration has not shown the slightest evidence that it comprehends the point of view of the Senator from Alaska and

the Senator from Oregon and others of us who have been trying to change the foreign aid program for some time.

So far as I can see, this administration does not even show that it has any understanding of what the Comptroller General of the United States has been pointing out for years as being involved in our foreign aid program—inefficiency, waste, corruption, and threats to the peace. With evidence so clear, I am at a loss to understand why this administration and previous administrations have not tried to put into effect the necessary reforms based upon the reports of our own Comptroller General. When Congress has acted to write changes into law over administration objections, those changes are subsequently advertised as great improvements by the administration. Of course, there are many more changes that any administration would find useful if it could bring itself to recognize that in the past Congress has shown good judgment in amending the program.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. I know the Senator appreciates it, but I wonder how many others appreciate, that our foreign military aid program, which is ostensibly designed to check communism and the military advances of the Soviet Union and others—China among others—has resulted in our giving money for that purpose to countries which use the arms to fight each other. I refer to the case of India and Pakistan; Greece and Turkey, which fight each other over Cyprus; and the latest development, our offering arms to Jordan, to be used by them to raid Israel and to kill people.

It is fantastic that the administration does not appreciate that fact and serve notice on those countries that no more military aid will be provided unless it is used for the purposes originally indicated, some of which are no longer valid.

Mr. MORSE. As the Senator from Alaska knows, he is unanswerably right. In past years, I have supported his amendments dealing with these matters, and shall again do so this year.

This afternoon I shall speak only in terms of rather broad generalities, and shall outline the case which I propose to make against the administration with respect to foreign aid; then we shall go into depth which respect to the serious mistakes which the Senator from Alaska has outlined. For example, he has referred to the military aid program of the United States in the Middle East.

I could not believe my eyes when I picked up the newspaper the other morning and read that the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, made a formal official proposal that we would supply Saudi Arabia with \$100 million worth of military aid. It is unbelievable.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. That is what he said in that speech. That is what he proposed in the speech he made. He proposed, formally, to build up in the Middle East military aid to Saudi Arabia to the tune of \$100 million.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1965

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 1837) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to make a few preliminary remarks involving discussion of procedure and the program, so far as opposition to the foreign aid bill now before the Senate is concerned.

We are now in the second day of debate on this bill. The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], made the opening statement for the proponents of the foreign aid bill.

This afternoon it falls to my responsibility to make the opening statement on behalf of the opposition to the foreign aid bill.

It is really not accurate to talk about proponents and opponents, because there is no difference between us as to the ultimate objective. We have a common objective, irrespective of differences in position on the bill as between affirmative support and negative opposition.

Our objective as U.S. Senators in connection with the foreign aid bill is to follow a course of action which we believe to be in the best interests of the United States.

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The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FLIGHT OF "GEMINI IV"—RECESS TO 1:30 O'CLOCK

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I have a happy suggestion to make to my majority leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], and to the floor manager of the foreign aid bill at the moment, the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN]. History is being made at this very moment. The eyes of the world are on two great patriots in a space ship who are in the process of coming down to earth. My suggestion is that no Senator should feel the slightest dereliction in his Senate duties because he is in front of a television set somewhere in the precincts of the Senate. I respectfully suggest that the Senate take a recess until those two great patriots are safely landed and all of us have had an opportunity to be participants as observers in that great chapter of American history. I make that suggestion.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, to recognize the achievement, and as a mark of respect and admiration for astronauts James A. McDivitt and Edward H. White, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess until 1:30 p.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the Senate, (at 12 o'clock and 57 minutes p.m.) took a recess until 1:30 o'clock the same day.

On the expiration of the recess the Senate reassembled and was called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. MANSFIELD in the chair).

RECESS UNTIL 2 P.M.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. As a further mark of respect and admiration for Astronauts James A. McDivitt and Edward H. White, the Senate will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

There being no objection, the Senate took a recess until 2 p.m. the same day.

On the expiration of the recess the Senate reassembled and was called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. MONROYA in the chair).

RECESS UNTIL 2:30 P.M.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for the same reasons previously stated, I move that the Senate stand in recess until the hour of 2:30 p.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate took a recess until 2:30 p.m.

On the expiration of the recess the Senate reassembled, when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. HARRIS in the chair).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. What is the will of the Senate?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TRIBUTES TO ASTRONAUTS JAMES A. McDIVITT AND EDWARD H. WHITE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if I may be recognized briefly, I should like to take this means to commend the astronauts, Mr. James A. McDivitt and Mr. Edward H. White, who have just completed a 4-day successful space flight. They carried much in the way of hopes as far as our own country is concerned. They comported themselves with valor, with dignity, and with courage.

We are just as happy as they are, as their wives are, as their families are, that they have been able to successfully complete this flight and add additional luster to the struggle that is going on in man's attempts to conquer outer space. The Senate extends to them its best wishes and congratulations.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, the successful flight of the astronauts, through orbit, is, first of all, testimony to their personal courage. I doubt whether anybody can quite appreciate the courage that has to be summoned up for a man to offer himself for a flight in space. It is a testimony also to their fidelity to their country and the contribution they can make to science and to the well-being and defense of their country.

In addition, it is testimony to man's unending curiosity about space, and his constant devotion to the endeavor of conquering space and distance.

I presume we can set apart perhaps the last 100 years as that period in which we conquered time, space, distance, and temperature, by means of the telephone, the telegraph, the radio, television, air conditioning, the airplane, and the helicopter. All of these are nothing more than man's conquest of natural forces.

Again two great interpid souls have offered themselves, along with others, for the purpose of conquering space; I say, All hail to their courage and to their devotion to their country.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I join our distinguished leaders in the remarks they have made commending the astronauts and all those who have been associated with them in making this accomplishment possible. It has been a great undertaking. It has called for adventure of the highest order. Even though the accomplishments thus far attained have been spectacular, and will continue to be so through the years in the impact they will have, it is difficult to envisage the extent to which this effort can and will be carried out.

I heard over the radio this morning, as I was driving to work, the voice of Dr.

Wehrner von Braun, speaking at a college commencement at which he was given an honorary doctor's degree, make this rather simple statement, but one of great implication—that man would continue to explore space as long as there was yet space unexplored.

When we think back to the times of exploration by water, that same spirit was in being. Even to this day, if there is any unexplored area anywhere on earth, man seeks to explore it. It is an easy prediction to reflect that that will continue. The flight which has just been made has done much toward forwarding us to that day.

Dr. von Braun, in the same statement, laid down a kind of calendar of events as they may happen in the future. It is freely predicted that we shall land a man on the moon by 1970, within 5 years of this time.

I heard Dr. von Braun make a speech at one time in which he said:

We shall not stop at the moon. We shall go to Mars. We shall go to Venus—yes, we shall go to the outermost of galaxies.

It shows the dreams that motivate those people as they search the outer reaches of space.

It has been my good fortune to watch those developments at rather close hand. Fifteen years ago Dr. Von Braun and his team of German scientists were moved to my hometown. There they did work on missiles. In 1955 they constructed the first moderate-range missile, a range of probably a hundred miles. I remember how they were able to stretch that distance until they attained a range of some 1,500 miles.

I remind Senators that it was a missile that was produced at Redstone Arsenal in my hometown, the souped-up Redstone that became Jupiter-C, that put up the first satellite for the free world. It was the Redstone that carried Alan Shepard.

There in my hometown I have watched through the years the development of the mightiest space machine in the world. The Saturn has an initial thrust of 1½ million foot-pounds. Saturn 5, which is the ultimate in that development, will have five times that thrust; and it will be that mechanism which will be used to put a man on the moon within the next 5 years.

We should feel good that this mission has been so well completed. We should feel happy. We should feel humbled, and at the same time we should look to the future with a great deal of confidence as to what man can do and will do.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, at 10 minutes to 1 the Senator from Oregon suggested to the majority leader that, in view of the fact that we were living in a great hour of history, it would be most appropriate if the Senate took a recess so that Senators could join in the experience of the writing of that history. The majority leader [Mr. MANSFIELD], in his characteristic way, immediately joined me in that suggestion, and I thank him. I know I thank him in behalf of the entire membership of the Senate for declaring the recess that permitted us in the last hour and a half to see this

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Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I believe Mr. McNAMARA spoke about selling military equipment. I do not believe he called it aid. If the Senator is referring to the same article that I read, it was not aid, as we use the word; rather, he was speaking about authorizing the sale of the equipment for cash to Saudi Arabia.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator believe that the sale of \$100 million worth of military equipment to Saudi Arabia is not aid?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is not aid in the usual sense in which we use that word. In the Senator's sense, of course, all of it is aid.

Mr. MORSE. What does the Senator think I have been protesting all these years?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I believe the Record could leave the impression that we were giving aid. I did not know that the Senator was using the word in that fashion.

Mr. MORSE. That is what I have been protesting; namely, our Government's giving or selling weapons of war to endanger the peace of the world, to kill thousands of human beings, and then ringing church bells on Sundays. What national hypocrisy.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. How does the administration reconcile its oft reiterated pleas for peace on earth, and the peacekeeping objective as being the prime objective of the United States in the world, with going into the arms business on this tremendous scale?

Mr. MORSE. I never look to this administration to reconcile its inconsistencies or its malfeasances.

Mr. President, going back to my thesis, imagine building up the military power of dictatorships in the Middle East, which at the very moment that I speak are talking about making war. Does anyone believe that the McNamara program for \$100 million worth of military equipment for Saudi Arabia will be used for the sheiks to play tiddly-winks or hopscotch or hide-and-seek or ring-around-the-rosy? We are dealing with dangerous men. The proposal is to equip them. A great deal of it will find its way to the royalist Yemenis, who are fighting the Egyptians whose war machine we feed with surplus food. The administration has the audacity to try to tell the American people, through this misleading propaganda, that we are a nation of peace.

We are a threat to the peace of the world. It is about time that the American people faced the fact that if they follow this administration in its war plans, hundreds of thousands of American boys will die in battle in the months not too far ahead—but not with the vote of the Senator from Oregon.

We will either practice our ideals, or we will have no ideals. Imagine the great sums of money, taken from the taxpayers of the United States, being used to build up competing military ma-

chines in India and Pakistan, which would be of no value to the United States in case of war with Russia. The American people do not know, because they have been taken so far down the road to government by concealment that they do not have the facts as to what their Government is up to, about the high secrecy on which American foreign policy is conducted. The American people do not have the facts about the police state institution that has been built into this so-called democracy, known as the CIA, whose activities, I may say as chairman of the Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs, in Latin America have been a source of threat to the peace, time and time again.

Mr. President, I do not intend to support that kind of foreign policy, because I believe that we have a sacred obligation to future generations of American boys and girls. For example, we should return to the type of foreign policy that Franklin Roosevelt envisioned when, 20 years ago, he tried to obtain support for following a course of action in Indochina directly opposite to the course of action that the present administration is following and preceding administrations have followed in Indochina. Had we followed the Franklin Roosevelt program, American boys would not be dying in southeast Asia today.

There are many who do not wish to listen to tough talk. There are many who do not wish to face up to the ugly realities. They would much prefer to take the flag behind the chair of the Presiding Officer and wave it into tatters with their so-called superpatriotism.

Let me say to those who are so anxious to have American boys die in southeast Asia, "Come on. The line forms at the right. Offer yourselves as a substitute for an American boy whom you are drafting and sending over there. You come back in a coffin, since you are so anxious that there be killing of God's children, whatever their race or color, in an unnecessary, unjustifiable, illegal, and unconscionable war in southeast Asia." It is a war that the President cannot justify under his oath as Commander in Chief under the Constitution of the United States, because the President does not have the slightest right under the Constitution to send a single boy to his death in southeast Asia without a declaration of war.

Where is the declaration of war? I will tell the Senate why a proposed declaration of war is not before the Congress. The American people would not accept it, for a proposal really to make the present war legal under the Constitution would then bring forth a demand from coast to coast across this country for a consideration of all facets of the international law implications of such a war.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. Has the distinguished Senator from Oregon any explanation as to why neither the present administration nor any preceding administration has ever invoked articles 1, 2, 33, and 37 of the United Nations Char-

ter, to which we are signatories, and which we helped to create?

Mr. MORSE. They do not have any good reason. But I will tell the Senator what some of their alibis are. There has never come from the State Department a single justification that has any international law standing for the United States violating its signature to the United Nations Charter. We stand in open violation of the United Nations Charter, and the Secretary of State knows it. All he can do is go around insulting those who have forgotten more about international law and more about Asia than he will ever know. His attacks upon the academic world, the colleges and the universities of this country, are inexcusable.

I renew this afternoon my challenge to the Secretary of State to meet me on any campus or campuses that he wishes to name for a discussion of American foreign policy in respect to the war in Asia. I also warn him that he will not be protected in the debate by executive privilege. We shall tell the American people all the facts that have been made available to us, which is a small percentage of what ought to be made available, because not even in the Senate are we protected from Government by concealment.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. As the Senator well knows, articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter prescribe and make mandatory peaceful approaches in international difficulties. Article 33 outlines eight different steps which, if we adhered to the charter to which we are a signatory, are prescribed and to be used first of all before any other methods are used. If all of those have been used and failed, article 37 makes it mandatory that we shall, not may, then lay the issue before the Security Council. Is there any understandable explanation why that course has never been tried?

Mr. MORSE. The Senator from Alaska has brought out the fact time and time again for the past 2 years. So has the senior Senator from Oregon. So have the great scholars of the universities of this country—time and time again. But such a procedure would interfere with the propaganda of this administration and with its concealed purposes in Asia.

I told the Senator that I would call his attention to some of the rationalizations and alibis of the spokesmen for the administration. When I have pleaded in the Foreign Relations Committee for the submission of these great issues to the United Nations, the answer of the State Department is, "Senator, do you not think Russia would veto that course in the Security Council?"

My reply is, "Perhaps. I cannot be sure, and neither can you. We shall never know until we try. But I believe Red Russia would veto it."

That is why I desire to put Red Russia on the spot. That is why I wish to show who it is that has refused to resort to the rule of law for the settlement of threats to the peace. That is why I want

Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500320023-0

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to get my country out of the position of international outlawry and make it a law-abiding nation again. That is why I wish my country to get back within its treaty obligations. I wish to prove that it is not the United States, but a Communist nation, that is seeking to resort to outlawry in order to cause threats to the peace of the world.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. Is there not a provision in the United Nations Charter that if we fail in the Security Council, we still have the opportunity to lay the issue before the General Assembly?

Mr. MORSE. That is the point. I have said to the Secretary of State, "Why are you stopping with the Security Council section of the United Nations Charter? Read on. Read on and see what can be done by laying the matter before an extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations." It is our obligation to do so. After we put Russia on the spot, if she does veto the proposal—and she might surprise us, but let us assume that she vetoes it—what do we suppose would happen?

We would then have lined up 80, 85, 90, 95, or 100 nations of the world in favor of setting up what Franklin Roosevelt proposed 20 years ago before the United Nations even came into being, when he pleaded for an international trusteeship in Indochina, carried out by the peace-loving nations of the world. What do we suppose would be Russia's reaction and Red China's reaction if we had that kind of alignment? I think we would have no trouble getting it, but the plan requires leadership.

We have not been leading; we have been running out on our obligations under the United Nations Charter. Several things flashed through my mind as I surveyed over the weekend the pronouncements of the President and his official spokesmen—the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, McGeorge Bundy, and others—who have been trying to sell the propaganda line for a war in Asia at the same time they have talked about peace.

Mr. President, do you know what I think worries them? They are not so sure as they thought they had reason to be 30 days ago that Russia will continue to stand on the sidelines. It is perfectly clear that 30 days ago the administration thought that the hatred that Russia has for China, and the fear that Russia has for China, would cause Russia not to move. But there is clearly embedded and implied in some of the pronouncements over the weekend a growing concern as to what Russia may be up to. There are reports about anti-missile weapons in North Vietnam—from Russia. There are reports of some effective fighter-bombers in North Vietnam—from Russia. There are reports out of Russia itself that Russia does not intend to walk out on its obligations to North Vietnam. There is concern about some worrisome reports being received about movements within Red China.

The bombing of North Vietnam has not worked. The bombing of North

Vietnam has not driven the North Vietnamese to the conference table. The bombing of North Vietnam has not yet moved a single division of the North Vietnamese Army of more than 350,000 troops. Of course we are concerned. We have every right to be concerned. The bombing that we have been doing has not yet even stirred up a major overt military response; it has not resulted in the slightest inclination on the part of North Vietnam or the Vietcong to go to the conference table. It is not surprising that our leaders should start to show some signs of concern as to whether or not they have been on the right course. They have been on the wrong course from the beginning. Of course, the situation will become worse, not better.

Not so many days ago I sat in the Chamber and listened to the reservationists at the time the so-called \$700 million military bill for South Vietnam was before the Senate. Reservationist after reservationist in this body rose and pointed out and wanted it understood that when he voted for that bill, he was not voting a blank check. All of them wanted it understood that when they voted for the \$700 million, they expected to be consulted by the President if there was any plan to send additional troops to South Vietnam. They made good statements for home consumption, I suppose, if one believes in that kind of politics. But it was too much for me. The record will show that I replied to the reservationists.

I said, "You are being consulted right now. If any of you reservationists think you will be consulted, after you use this vehicle this afternoon in which the President has asked you to ride by way of a vote of confidence in him for supporting what he is doing in southeast Asia, you could not be more mistaken."

I wonder what those reservationists have to say today. Were the reservationists consulted before more troops were sent to Vietnam? Thousands more troops have been sent to South Vietnam; and the Senate was not consulted.

When we get through with certain amendments to the bill that I understand will be offered with the approval of the administration, including an amendment for the \$89 million proposal that I shall discuss before I finish my speech this afternoon, we shall have another maneuver on the part of the administration to have us hogtied and handcuffed even more, because those votes will be interpreted as further votes of confidence for making war in southeast Asia.

Mr. President, we must make up our minds whether or not we shall try to carry out the most important international commitment the United States has; namely, the commitment to honor our signature on existing treaties; or whether we shall follow a course of action in foreign policy of tearing up those treaties, so far as our responsibility toward them is concerned.

I fully realize, as I shall say in Madison Square Garden tomorrow night, that we cannot expect to follow the course of action that the senior Senator from Oregon and the junior Senator from Alaska (Mr. Gruening) have been following,

and win any popularity contests. But I have never been interested in popularity contests. I have been interested only in carrying out my trust under my oath that I have taken four times in the Senate. No partisan consideration will ever deter me from voting on the basis of the facts as I find them to be.

I had a fascinating experience this morning in the Committee on Foreign Relations. I am not privileged with propriety to say more than this: In my judgment, a considerable number of my colleagues on the Committee on Foreign Relations wish that our Government were following a different course of action than it is following in respect to the war in Asia. I know the argument—"But we are in the war. What can we do now? We are in it; we must go along. We will make a bad image around the world if we do not continue the program." Is not that some argument? Mr. President, what do you suppose would happen to a poor freshman student who was taking a course in logic in any university in this country if he so argued? His professor would call him in and advise with him as to whether or not he really had the capacity to continue his college work.

I say respectfully that if any Senator thinks there should be a change in our foreign policy, he should work, fight, and vote; not go along out of partisan consideration or because it might show that he differs with the President. I believe that the best friends the President has at any time are those who are willing to differ with him when they think he is wrong.

I shall return to a discussion of some matters of procedure in connection with this debate. It is not the intention of the senior Senator from Oregon to engage in a debate that could be described as a debate in extenso. I know the Senate rather well. I doubt if very much could be said in the Senate to change the position of very many Senators on issues as they arise. Of course, that should not be the case. However, I think that crystallization or atrophy has set in—I do not care which word is used. So, I believe that those in opposition to the bill have the responsibility of making an adequate record.

I have no intention, may I say to the chairman of the committee, as I have already said to the majority leader, of prolonging the debate to any great length. I shall speak at too great length for most of my colleagues, no matter how brief I may be. However, I intend to make a respectful, adequate case for the record, and for future reference, on these issues as they arise.

I announce this afternoon, as I have announced to the majority and minority leaders, that I will not, as of now, enter into any agreements for time limitations, or any amendments, or any time certain to vote. However, that will not preclude, if my colleagues on the opposite side agree, my entering into such arrangements after we feel that an adequate record has been made in opposition to the bill and in support of the amendments that we shall offer.

I hope that will put to rest the concern that some Senators seem to have that we may be in for a long summer on this bill. On the other hand, the spirit of cooperation on the part of the opposition should, and I am sure that it will, receive reciprocity from the proponents of the bill. We shall expect and ask for understandings from time to time in regard to the order of taking up amendments, the accommodation in respect to the length of the daily sessions, and the postponement of certain matters to meet reasonable and legitimate needs of Senators. However, I want the record to be perfectly clear that we will not engage in what might be called a lengthy debate, although we will not be deterred from making whatever record we believe needs to be made on a given issue, to help our positions so far as any participation in the debate is concerned, the offering of amendments, debate on the amendments, and pressing for a vote thereon.

I shall start this afternoon with an amendment. However, before I offer that amendment and ask to have it made the pending business, I wish to discuss two or three procedural matters in connection with it. I shall need the attention of the acting Parliamentarian in connection with certain questions that I shall raise in respect to this amendment.

I believe that courtesy, fair play, and proper respect are due to the President of the United States on the part of each of us. That belief justifies my calling up as my first amendment one which deals with his proposal to add \$89 million to the foreign aid bill for what he refers to as an amount of money needed to start an economic program in southeast Asia, not limited to South Vietnam, but to the countries in southeast Asia.

This bill was before the Committee on Foreign Relations this morning. I offered two amendments. I offered one amendment which proposed that the \$89 million for economic assistance in southeast Asia be granted, but that the military aid program be reduced by a similar amount—that is the military program anywhere in the world—and that decision be left with the administration as to where the \$89 million of military aid should be eliminated.

Mr. President, the administration could cut out many times \$89 million from our military aid program and still have somewhere near a legitimate military aid program. I am for certain types of military aid.

As I expected my amendment was defeated, although there were four votes for it, and much language from Senators who voted against the amendment. I am so accustomed to receiving the words and not the votes. I am accustomed to receiving pats on the back out in the cloakroom, but not the votes.

As one of my colleagues said to Mrs. Morse in the dining room after the vote on the \$700 million vote of confidence, "Midge, I hope you noticed that yesterday my vote was very weak."

Her reply was, "But I heard you."

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. GRUENING. Is it not correct that four votes in the Committee on Foreign Relations are a distinct improvement over the lone fight that the senior Senator from Oregon has been carrying on for so many years?

Mr. MORSE. I have not been alone. The Senator from Alaska has been with me from the beginning. He has been my teacher.

Mr. GRUENING. But not on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. MORSE. I have voted alone in the committee many times. I have received the finest, most courteous, and considerate treatment in the Committee on Foreign Relations. However, I do not have the votes.

Mr. GRUENING. The Senator probably observed that in the vote of confidence, there was an increase of 50 percent.

Mr. MORSE. And more words, too. We received more verbal support on the issue of the so-called vote of confidence than we every received before. I predict to the Senator from Alaska that we shall have even more support a year from now.

Mr. GRUENING. I am informed that that will be true in the House. In the Senate, the gain was 50 percent, with the accession of one additional supporter. However, in the House, support for our position was increased from 0 to 7, which mathematicians would consider to be infinity.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish there were some way the President could be apprised of what I am satisfied are the deep feelings at the grassroots in this Republic. One cannot go across the country, as I have done, without recognizing the great uneasiness and concern on the part of the average American citizen about what we are doing in Asia, and the bewilderment of the average citizen, who says, "How does it happen that we seem to be doing this all alone? How does it happen that, for the most part, all we are getting from our alleged allies is words, but no real support?"

The President is going to have a sad awakening about the true feeling of the American people. I should like to save him from it. As the Senator from Alaska knows, the President and I have stood shoulder to shoulder on so many issues, for so many years, that I am anything but happy in finding myself in such complete disagreement with the President in regard to so many phases of American foreign policy. I blame his advisers more than I blame him. Nevertheless, he has to analyze the advice he gets; that is his responsibility.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. Does not the Senator from Oregon consider it a great pity, when the President has such a magnificent domestic program, with so many parts of it that we can applaud enthusiastically, for example, the civil rights program; the educational program, in connection with which the Senator from Oregon played so important a part; the war on poverty; the campaign to beautify

America; the antipollution program; the coming enactment of a hospital-care program; and many other things that all of us can wholeheartedly applaud—to find the domestic program so greatly diminished by the program which looms up in southeast Asia, where our policy, which I believe is so mistakenly pursued, will wreck all our domestic programs, because the Moloch of war will consume all of them?

Mr. MORSE. If we get into a massive war, or even a minor one, we shall have to forget all about domestic programs, and we shall also have to forget all about many other things that will rise to plague Americans in respect to their very basic freedoms and liberties, because if we get into a massive war, this time it will be a total war. A moment ago I said the military aid we make available to Pakistan, Greece, Turkey, and India will be of no value to the United States in case of a war in Asia. However, our military-aid program is sold to the American people on the claimed basis that it will be of aid in that connection.

Many Senators have been heard to say, for example, on political platforms, "Ah, but it is cheaper to keep a Pakistani boy or a Turkish boy or an Indian boy or a Greek boy in uniform than it is to keep an American boy in uniform." What tommyrot. Certainly it is tommyrot, because those Pakistani or Turkish or Greek or Indian boys would be of no value in case of a war with Russia, for that would be a fast nuclear war. The interesting thing is that Greece, India, Turkey, and Pakistan are dependent for their protection upon the canopy of American nuclear power. That is what protects them—not the military aid we send them. Pakistani leaders have said—as I have said many times in debate in the Senate—that they have no intention of sending their troops into southeast Asia. Their foreign minister says that is the problem of the United States. He says, "Our problem is India." What a position of morality that puts us in. We equip India and Pakistan militarily, so they can make war on each other; yet we talk about being a moral nation. Instead, we are a thoroughly hypocritical Nation, as regards our military foreign aid and assistance program, for we are doing the very things that cannot be reconciled with Christian morality.

Mr. GRUENING. If the Senator from Oregon will yield further, let me say that, speaking of morality, there was published in the Saturday newspapers an Associated Press story written by Malcolm Brown, a Pulitzer Prize winner, who has been in southeast Asia for many years, and who is the author of the recent very excellent book entitled "The New Face of War." In the article he pointed out that no prisoners are now being taken by either side. He wrote that as soon as either a South Vietnamese or North Vietnamese is caught off base, he is promptly killed, and sometimes first is tortured, and that is being done not only by "the wicked opposition" at which we point the finger of scorn, but also by our South Vietnamese ally, whom we are supposed

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to control. Under those circumstances, what has become of our morality?

Mr. MORSE. That is one of the most disturbing things about this situation.

Last Friday night, I was one of the speakers at the baccalaureate ceremony at Salem College, in West Virginia. While there, I talked with a great clergyman who recently returned from South Vietnam. Even though I had already known of the events to which he testified, nevertheless it was very shocking to hear of them from one who was there and saw them. We talk about our moral values, about our keeping spiritual faith, and about practicing our professions about peace; but, in spite of all that, we find that we are charged with being subversive.

On the floor of the Senate I said, "It is not going to be long"—and, in fact, it has already begun to develop—"until some will claim that God Almighty is on our side in this war."

That is always a part of war propaganda; the proponents always claim that God is on their side. In effect, they enlist God—without any word from Him about the enlistment.

Last week, I read in a religious periodical an editorial in which the writer paid his disrespects to me. The editorial was written by a clergyman. It was rather sad to find that apparently he had stopped reading the Bible, for if he had not stopped reading it, he could not have written the editorial. However, apparently he is going to try to associate God with our participation in this war; apparently he thinks that only Americans are the children of God.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield again to me?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. The Senator from Oregon will recall that 2 weeks ago there appeared in the New York Times an impressive advertisement, which at that time was signed by 2,500 clergymen of all faiths—Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish; and later the number of signers was increased to over 16,000. One of the points made in the advertisement was that the signatories felt they were properly qualified to interpret what we are doing in carrying out the will of God; and they felt that what we were doing was not the will of God, but, instead, was in violation of the will of God.

Therefore, I do not know that anyone is entitled to speak authoritatively on what divine providence believes, but certainly the clergy of this Nation, of all denominations, presumably because of their profession are in a better position to be able to interpret the divine will. They all felt definitely—certainly the 16,000 clergymen felt definitely, and so expressed themselves—that what we were doing in Vietnam was not the will of God but a violation of God's will and as was stated by them in the advertisements, would bring down the wrath of God upon our Nation if it persisted.

Mr. MORSE. I read that advertisement. Of course, as the Senator from Alaska knows, I have always held the position that I have no right to seek

to impose my religious convictions upon others in connection with debate on controversial issues, but I have a duty to be true to my religious convictions. The Senator knows I hold the point of view that the Holy of Holies, the sanctum of sanctums, the inner temple, does not happen to be my Congregational Church, or the material church of any other Member of this body of any faith. Those material structures are but symbols of the Holy of Holies.

It happens to be a deep faith of mine that the Holy of Holies resides in each of us, and takes the form of our conscience; and that when we sit in that temple, we never sit alone, but with our God.

Let me say to the Senator from Alaska that I have been approaching the moral issues connected with the foreign policy controversy from the standpoint of communion in that temple.

I do not intend to walk out on my spiritual obligations because of the arguments of political expediency which I heard this morning—which I have heard on the floor of the Senate, and which I hear in the cloakrooms—that merely because we happen to occupy a seat in the U.S. Senate, apparently Senators must not express any public disagreement with the President or show any disunity because it might be misinterpreted around the world.

We are not going to stop or change a course of action which is headed straight toward war by following political expediency. If we are going to stop war, if we are going to remove the growing danger of a holocaust, we must speak out, no matter how much criticism it may stir up within the administration, within the Senate, or within the country. If that is not the responsibility of every Senator, I do not know what is the responsibility of being a Senator.

I can be counted out if I am expected to participate in any "cover up" job or "snow" job for the administration while it finds its bearings.

Mr. President, returning to my amendment, it was offered this morning in the Committee on Foreign Relations and was voted down, although four members voted for it.

The amendment would have granted the President \$89 million for economic use in southeast Asia, but would have reduced military aid in the bill in various part of the world—to be decided by the President—by an equal amount of \$89 million.

Subsequent to the meeting, an able member of the staff—and I have supplemented by further inquiry and verified to my satisfaction his doubt—pointed out to me that there was a possibility, if my amendment were to be adopted that, later on in debate, I might be forestalling the offering of amendments for an additional cut in military aid.

I am going to offer amendments for additional cuts in military aid, as well as amendments for additional cuts in many other sections of the bill.

This afternoon, in sending my first amendment to the desk, I have changed it from the way it was offered this morning in the Committee on Foreign Rela-

tions. I send a copy to the Parliamentarian as well as a copy to the Presiding Officer before I ask some questions on it.

The amendment reads as follows:

At the end of section 504(a) add the following:

"Of the funds made available for the fiscal year 1966 pursuant to this section, \$9,000,000 shall be transferred to and consolidated with funds otherwise made available pursuant to section 212, which relates to authorization for technical cooperation and development grants, and \$80,000,000 shall be transferred to and consolidated with funds otherwise made available pursuant to section 402, which relates to authorization for supporting assistance. The funds so transferred shall remain available until expended solely for use in southeast Asia in accordance with the provisions of section 212 and section 402 respectively."

Please note that under the amendment, \$9 million would be transferred to and consolidated with funds made available pursuant to section 212, which deals with technical cooperation and development grants, and \$80 million would be transferred and consolidated with sections dealing with supporting assistance.

We all know what supporting assistance is. Supporting assistance is money given to a country such as India, Turkey, Pakistan, or Thailand, or to any other country which maintains a military establishment far beyond its economic capacity to support.

Therefore, under the carefully titled "supporting assistance," we would be really granting, in a sense, additional military aid, and additional economic aid, as a sort of subsidy to one of those countries to maintain a higher military program than it could otherwise support.

Mr. President, for the benefit of the Parliamentarian, counsel for the committee has just advised me that the legislative counsel for the Senate suggests that I add an additional sentence to my amendment—inasmuch as we have been working out the wording of the amendment only during the past few hours—as follows:

Amounts transferred pursuant to this subsection shall not be taken into account in determining amounts authorized to be transferred pursuant to section 610.

I have been advised that this language is necessary to take care of certain technical problems which otherwise would arise.

I do not wish to offer the amendment in this form unless I can be sure of a favorable answer, from a parliamentary standpoint, to the following question, which I raise.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. MORSE. If I offer the amendment and ask to have it made the pending business of the Senate, will the transfer of \$9 million, to be consolidated with funds otherwise made available pursuant to section 212, which relates to authorizations for technical cooperation and development grants, in any way preclude the Senator from Oregon or any other Senator from subsequently, at some point during the course of the debate, from offering an amendment which would seek to reduce the amount of money in the

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foreign aid bill for authorization for technical cooperation and development grants?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from Oregon that it is not within the province of the Chair to construe or interpret amendments or the effect thereof. However, if the amendment were adopted, any other portion of the bill would still be amendable, perhaps in such a way that it might have an effect on the provisions of this amendment, or the effect of this amendment.

Mr. MORSE. I believe I understand the Chair's statement. However, I hope the Chair will bear with me. Assume that my amendment were adopted, and that it would transfer \$9 million to the section that deals with the authorization for technical cooperation and development grants. To make it easy to follow, let us assume that the next amendment to be offered by a Senator would decrease the authorization in the bill for technical cooperation and development grants by 50 percent. Would the adoption of my amendment preclude another Senator or the Senator from Oregon from subsequently offering an amendment to reduce the authorization for technical cooperation and development grants by 50 percent or any other percentage?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. In further answer to the question of the Senator from Oregon, the Chair advises the Senator that so long as the subsequent amendment did not change the language which had been adopted in this amendment, the subsequent amendment would be in order, and there would be no restriction on it.

Mr. MORSE. A further parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. MORSE. An amendment that sought to reduce by a given percentage the amount of money in the bill proposed to be authorized for technical assistance and development grants would be in order even though this amendment had been adopted, which added to the section dealing with technical assistance and development grants the sum of \$9 million. Is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MORSE. I am sorry that I seem to be so technical, but I have learned from experience that now is the time to close the gates.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's inquiries are perfectly in order.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I have one more question to address to the Chair. Let me now go to the next part of my amendment, dealing with \$80 million which would be transferred and consolidated with funds otherwise made available pursuant to section 402, which relates to authorizations for supporting assistance. I have the same question. If that amendment were adopted, and I or any other Senator should subsequently decide to offer an amendment to reduce the supporting assistance in the bill by any given percentage or any given amount, would such amendment be in order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct; so long as it did not attempt to amend the language of an amendment agreed to by the Senate.

Mr. MORSE. I thank the Chair. As usual, I thank the Parliamentarian. I yield now to the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I should like to ask the senior Senator from Oregon whether the \$89 million refers to the proposed development of the Mekong Delta.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator mean the President's proposal for \$89 million?

Mr. GRUENING. Yes; does the Senator's amendment deal with that proposal?

Mr. MORSE. It deals with the President's proposal to increase the foreign aid bill by \$89 million. The amendment I would offer merely provides that the \$89 million shall not be granted over and above the authorization of the foreign aid bill, but will have to be included within the foreign aid bill; and to do that we would transfer \$9 million of the present foreign aid bill to the technical cooperation development grants and \$80 million to supporting assistance.

In other words, if my amendment were adopted, the President would not get an additional \$89 million, but would get the \$89 million within the present authorization amount for expenditure in accordance with whatever blueprint plans he had for assistance in the Mekong Delta, Laos, Thailand, or any other place in southeast Asia.

Mr. GRUENING. I ask the Senator from Oregon whether he does not believe there are sufficient funds in the foreign aid program, as requested by the White House, to take care of the situation, without providing an additional \$89 million.

Mr. MORSE. Yes; that is why the amendment would be offered. It would not add \$89 million. It would hold the President to the ceiling of the present bill. Of course, I shall try to lower that ceiling.

Mr. GRUENING. Does the Senator from Oregon believe that if the amendment or some variation thereof were adopted, it would not be in effect an authorization or commitment to spend a billion dollars in further developments, and would be so taken?

Mr. MORSE. That will be developed in the debate. The President has been honest and frank with us and with the Senate and the whole country. He has made it clear that this is only the beginning. He made very clear that the \$89 million is a starter. If we can change our military status in southeast Asia, no Member of this body will be more strenuous than the senior Senator from Oregon in urging our effort to develop the economic freedom of southeast Asia, so that the people there can become politically free.

However, I am a little disturbed about the President's wish to spend \$89 million in a so-called crash economic program in this part of the world, while at the same time he is destroying many times \$89 million worth of property by our course of bombings in North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

This is not the first time that a foreign aid program has been sent to Congress, followed by a later request for more

money for Vietnam alone. That is getting to be a timeworn device for increasing foreign aid, because Congress is faced with a foreign aid program under which sums have been allocated to various countries, and we are solemnly assured that any reduction in them would be a breach of faith.

But the needs of a real hotspot like Vietnam are not included. Then we are asked to spend more just for Vietnam. That was done once in connection with military aid. This year it is being done to increase supporting assistance by \$80 million and technical aid by \$9 million. And we will all be assured that a "no" vote will cause a great collapse in confidence in us.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. In view of the likelihood that the program will be a \$1 billion program—a very extensive and major program—as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, can the Senator tell me whether, there have been extensive hearings as to the feasibility, economic, engineering, and otherwise, which would justify the Congress in committing itself essentially to the proposed program without further investigation?

Mr. MORSE. There have been extensive hearings which would justify me in saying that the record has been made in hearing in support of the proposed \$89 million program. In all fairness I should say also that the Foreign Relations Committee has conducted voluminous hearings on the entire program of foreign aid. I believe the situation is pretty well understood by members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Again, as the Senator knows, I am a stickler for making a specific record on a specific proposal to which we can turn and show that the amount of money that is being proposed for various items is being wisely proposed.

I shall make the following statement to the Senator because he can get the document. I cannot use it on the floor of the Senate because when it was handed to us in the committee this morning, it was made perfectly clear that it was to be used for confidential use within the committee.

This morning we had a memorandum that I understood to be one that indicated the items in the program for which it was contemplated the \$89 million would be spent. I do not wish to leave the impression that there has been any finality of judgment. I wish I had the memorandum before me so that I could refresh my memory as to its caption. There was not much discussion of it in the committee. I believe it was in the recommendation and illustrative stage. It was to indicate by illustration what the administration has in mind in the expenditure of the \$89 million.

Very interestingly, what little discussion there was included the raising of doubting questions immediately: "Why here? Why there? Why for this? Why for that?"

It was pointed out that our discussion this morning was not intended for the purpose of passing judgment on those questions.

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But what occurred bears out what the Senator has said. We certainly ought to have hearings to determine whether or not we believe the President's program is a wise one in regard to the particular expenditure.

I am glad that the Senator has raised the question, for it shows the problem which is confronting us. We do not get requests for hearings in depth in regard to a program that the President wishes to put in operation. To the contrary, we are in a state in which the President makes a blanket request, and then we are supposed to act on it peremptorily. I believe that is the worst possible way to develop foreign policy. No matter how they wish to clothe it and no matter how they desire to deny it, the fact is that that is a rubberstamp approach to our job in the Senate. I believe we serve the interests of the public by not rubberstamping the President.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. In the Senator's experience on the Foreign Relations Committee, have there been many—or, indeed, have there been any—specific requests for a specific project as distinguished from the general policy of asking for a lump sum of money, and then allowing the AID agency to use that money as it sees fit? Is that procedure not setting a substantial precedent which would seem to commit the Senate specifically to a program?

Mr. MORSE. In all fairness, I would have to say that there have been a good many instances in which we have been asked to pass upon specific projects in this sense. The workbooks that the Department of State and the AID people send up to us at the beginning of our hearings on the annual foreign aid bill and for discussion during our executive sessions on it contain detailed breakdowns of money as it has been spent in the past and as it is proposed to be spent projectwise in the future. Yet I would also have to say that we do not spend any considerable amount of time on those individual projects. They are sort of used as examples.

Mr. GRUENING. Illustrative.

Mr. MORSE. Illustrative material. One of my criticisms of the foreign aid bills of the past several years has been the delegation of decisionmaking power to the members of the AID organization and the State Department rather than to have the committee itself exercise a greater check on individual expenditures. I shall go into that subject at some length in a few days when we reach a discussion of my amendment which the committee has recommended, although it was changed somewhat, but I believe it still is a good amendment. That amendment would restore to some extent the checking power of the Congress upon the foreign aid program and bring the whole present program to an end in 1967 and start all over again. That is a pretty important check. I do not wish to go into that question today. I wish to try to limit myself to the present amendment. But these questions are pertinent. I believe I would have to say, in reply to the

Senator from Alaska, that what we have here is a repetition of the tendency of the present administration to ask for blanket approval, and the fewer questions asked, the greater pleasure will be the response.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. Does not the Senator understand that in the President's Johns Hopkins address, when he was explaining the need for bombing North Vietnam, he was offering \$1 billion as a kind of carrot to accompany the stick, and therefore make the people of southeast Asia feel that there was another no less important aspect other than military to our policy, namely, to give them economic aid as well as to apply military pressure, which hitherto we have so much emphasized?

Mr. MORSE. I believe at the time the Senator from Alaska, as I recall, described it as a sort of bribe proposal—a statement in which I joined. I thought it was a little unfortunate for the President to offer them a great deal of money and at the same time try to defend bombing North Vietnam.

Mr. GRUENING. Has the Senator given sufficient attention to the program to know whether the program would convey any material benefits to North Vietnam? I ask that question because it seems to me that if that were the "carrot" going along with the "stick" of bombing designed to induce the North Vietnamese to cry "uncle" and to quit, an offer of economic aid which would largely benefit South Vietnam would not be very persuasive.

Mr. MORSE. Nothing would stop the President from spending any of the money in the proposed program in North Vietnam in the due course of time. I have heard no specific proposal to do so. It would be extremely difficult to interpret the President's speeches over the weekend in any other light than to say that they indicate that the President would not be adverse to spending money in North Vietnam if a negotiated settlement were reached.

But I shall tell the Senator what we can do. We can take judicial notice now that the American taxpayer will eventually rebuild all the devastation that we have caused in North Vietnam.

When we are through bombing China—and I believe we are on our way to bombing China in the not very distant future—we shall rebuild it all. But we shall be just plain goofy. What we ought to be doing is avoiding all that devastation, all that waste. What those people have developed has been developed at great sacrifice over the years. I do not know why we must destroy first and then pay for the rebuilding. If we get into a war with China and North Vietnam, we shall be engaged in it for a minimum of 25 years. We shall have perpetual war, not on a major scale after we have laid waste; but they will keep sniping at us. They will hate us for hundreds of years. Eventually, they will kick us out. The Senator from Alaska and I will not be here; but no matter how many centuries it takes, we shall be driven out. We shall never be able to

buy good will with American dollars. So I am at a loss to understand the goofy performance in which we are engaged.

Mr. GRUENING. We are not going to buy good will when we are bombing North Vietnam, when we are raining napalm and other bombs on North Vietnam. We cannot be considered ambassadors of good will at the same time we are bombing.

Mr. MORSE. One who listens to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State would think we were killing no one in North Vietnam. I have tried for weeks to have the administration tell the American people the number of casualties we have caused in North Vietnam and in South Vietnam. The American people are entitled to know. If anyone says we can bomb munition centers, bridges, transportation centers, terminal centers, and railroad yards, and not kill human beings, he is misleading the American people. That needs to be said on the floor of the Senate. Of course we are killing North Vietnamese. We are killing thousands in South Vietnam. I hope it is true that we are not killing them in massive numbers. But this is a killing war. The Defense Department keeps and publishes all the figures of killings and casualties in the south committed by the Vietcong. But they tell nothing of the South Vietnamese civilians we are killing and maiming with our napalm and strafing and artillery.

A few minutes ago, the Senator from Alaska spoke about the shocking atrocities that are being committed by the South Vietnamese, by the North Vietnamese, and by the Vietcong. I am advised by reliable persons, who know what is taking place over there, that this war has made a scrap of paper of the Geneva treaty, which bears the signature of the United States, in respect to the treatment of war prisoners. The only argument I have heard is the weak one: "It really does not apply, because we have not declared war." Imagine that. I am not saying that U.S. forces are guilty of atrocities, but I am saying that American military personnel have stood by while atrocities have been committed by the South Vietnamese; and we have yet to file our first complaint in the United Nations against North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the Vietcong for violations of the articles of war.

The period of this war will not be a proud chapter in their country's history, for future American boys and girls to read about. I know that war is dirty and brutal; but there are articles of war aimed at making it less dirty and less brutal.

It is not often that one sees published in the American press what appears in the foreign press, because the American people are being treated, by and large, to a "kept" press, so far as war news from South Vietnam is concerned. One of the reasons is that the Pentagon and the State Department will not let American correspondents send home the truth. But it can be obtained in many European newspapers. If the American people could only read what is written about us in the European press by European cor-

respondents, they would be much surprised. The European correspondents report the news some way, somehow. It is interesting to see, from a comparison of the photographs that appear in the American press with those that appear in the European press, what is taking place in southeast Asia.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. From the Senator's knowledge of the state of the war in South Vietnam, does he believe that the construction of Mekong Delta dams and other facilities can occur while a war is raging and the Vietcong is, supposedly, holding a large section of that country?

Mr. MORSE. That is one of the great difficulties I have with this bit of propaganda that the administration is handing out.

I agree that we ought to be of economic assistance to the people of South Vietnam, as does the Senator from Alaska. I want to be of assistance to them. I wish to do something to improve their health. I want to do something to increase their longevity, which now is from 30 to 35 years. I want to do something to improve their education. I want to do something to overcome their lack of electricity. I want to provide electric power for them. But I do not see how there is any hope of doing that while the war is going on, because the proposal is to supply this aid in the very area that is controlled by the Vietcong. The Vietcong control about 75 percent of the land area of South Vietnam.

Apparently, a complex has been developed in this country that the dollar speaks; and that if we will only say to the ignorant, illiterate masses of South Vietnam, "If you will stop your fighting, we will give you a large sum of money and a large amount of economic assistance," they will stop their fighting. But we receive too many reports that they hate us, suspect us, do not believe us. They are suspicious that we are laying a trap for them.

I do not believe we can build such dams now. We shall have to cooperate in an economic program for the South Vietnamese; but we shall have to bring in many other people to help us. That is why we ought to be stressing efforts to obtain an honorable negotiated settlement which will come as nearly as possible to adopting Franklin Roosevelt's notion of an international trusteeship. For many years I have pleaded for the economic freedom of those people. Only then will they be able to develop their political freedom. That is my formula. People do not dispute my formula; they merely think it is too idealistic.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. The Senator from Oregon well knows that whenever a major hydro development has been proposed in this country, such as TVA, Boulder Dam, Bonneville, or Grand Coulee, hearings have been held before the appropriate committees of Congress to consider the engineering feasibility. Has anything similar been proposed concerning the Mekong Delta program?

Mr. MORSE. The answer is "No."

Mr. GRUENING. How can the Senate justify giving a blank check for \$89 million? It will be a commitment. It is so considered. We will have embarked on it by making the first downpayment.

Mr. MORSE. It would be more than \$89 million, as the Senator pointed out. There would be a commitment for more money.

Mr. GRUENING. \$1 billion.

Mr. MORSE. I do not know how much it would be. However, it would be a huge sum of money.

I am opposed to starting the program now. I am for ending the war.

Mr. GRUENING. I share that view.

Mr. MORSE. The major problem that confronts us is getting the killing stopped.

Mr. GRUENING. I share that view emphatically. I suggest that the fighting be stopped before we start an economic reconstruction. As of now, both sides are in the constant process of destruction. However, it is proposed that we embark on a program which would involve the expenditure of more than \$1 billion while the destruction is continuing.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, so far as South Vietnam is concerned, we have no guarantee that any construction that we would initiate would continue to stand as long as the fighting continues.

I think it is proper for me to say this, although I should like to have counsel for the committee pay close heed. I shall not go very far. I do not propose to discuss the specific contents of the memorandum that was given to the Committee on Foreign Relations this morning. However, I believe that it is appropriate to say that it is not contemplated that the \$89 million would all be spent in South Vietnam. In fact, it is not contemplated that a very large share of the money would be spent in South Vietnam.

A large share of it, so far as tentative plans are concerned, would be spent in southeast Asia, but not in South Vietnam.

Counsel for the committee has pointed out to me that the President's message itself bears out what I have just said. The message spells out some of this recommendations. The part that I shall refer to is found on page 2.

This, in a substantial way, is a good substitute for my discussion of the memorandum that was handed to us this morning which contained the caveat that, in effect, it was not to be used outside the committee. I read from the Presidential message:

To support our own effort, I ask the Congress to authorize and appropriate for fiscal year 1968 an additional \$89 million for the Agency for International Development for expanded programs of economic and social development in southeast Asia.

This money will serve many purposes:

First: Approximately \$10 million will provide the first installment of our contribution to the accelerated development of the Mekong River Basin.

I read further from page 2 of the President's message:

Second: Five million dollars will be used to support electrification cooperatives near

three provincial towns—Long Xuyen, Dalat, and Nha Trang—in South Vietnam.

Reading further:

Third: Seven million dollars will help provide improved medical and surgical services, especially in the more remote areas of Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.

This money would be spent outside South Vietnam.

I read further from the Presidential message:

Fourth: Approximately \$6 million will be used to train people for the construction of roads, dams, and other small-scale village projects in Thailand and Laos.

Reading further:

Fifth: Approximately \$45 million will be used to finance increasing imports of iron and steel, cement, chemicals and pesticides, drugs, trucks, and other essential goods necessary for a growing civilian economy. This money will allow factories not only to continue but through investment, to expand production of both capital and consumer goods. It will provide materials for urgently needed low-cost housing. And it will maintain production incentives and avoid inflation. It is not easy for a small country, with a low income, to fight a war on its own soil and at the same time persist in the business of nation building. The additional import support which I propose will help Vietnam to persevere in this difficult task.

Sixth: An additional \$7 million will supplement the present program of agricultural development and support additional government services in all three countries, and will help in the planning of further industrial expansion in the secure areas of Vietnam.

Mr. GRUENING. That would be South Vietnam.

Mr. MORSE. That would be South Vietnam.

Mr. GRUENING. There is no provision contained in the proposal for economic aid that would do anything that would induce the North Vietnamese to feel that they would be a part of the program and thus induce them to stop their fighting. Is that correct?

Mr. MORSE. It is not spelled out. However, the President has made it very clear in his public statements that if they stopped their fighting, he would give them some money.

Mr. GRUENING. Does the Senator believe that this is an argument that would be listened to by the people who are being bombed daily?

Mr. MORSE. It would make them very suspicious. I believe that it is too bad that we are supplying the Communists with the kind of propaganda they use. What propaganda is Red China putting out? What propaganda is North Vietnam putting out? I believe that they are very unfair. This is not the President's motivation. However, I do not know why he opens himself up to this kind of propaganda attack.

The Communists charge him with trying to buy an end to this war with American dollars. As they put it, "They will not fall for it."

Mr. GRUENING. I thank the Senator.

Mr. MORSE. I thank the Senator from Alaska for his contribution.

Mr. President, on the basis of the parliamentary rulings that I have received, I now offer my corrected amendment,

and ask that it be read and made the pending business of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 11, line 14, insert the following:

At the end of section 504(a) add the following:

"Of the funds made available for the fiscal year 1966 pursuant to this section, \$9,000,000 shall be transferred to and consolidated with funds otherwise made available pursuant to section 212, which relates to authorization for technical cooperation and development grants, and \$80,000,000 shall be transferred to and consolidated with funds otherwise made available pursuant to section 402, which relates to authorization for supporting assistance. The funds so transferred shall remain available until expended solely for use in southeast Asia in accordance with the provisions of section 212 and section 402 respectively. Amounts transferred pursuant to this subsection shall not be taken into account in determining amounts authorized to be transferred pursuant to section 610."

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I have about finished my discussion of the amendment. I shall have no objection to voting on the amendment if the Senate remains in session tonight. However, that is entirely up to the opponents of the amendment and to the leadership of the Senate.

I believed that we owed the President the courtesy, out of respect to him, of starting with this amendment, because this is what the country is talking about at the present time. This is the latest request that the President has made of Congress.

The Committee on Foreign Relations took action on the matter this morning—unfortunate action in my judgment. However, I shall not speak at any greater length on this amendment.

I say to the majority leader that I made an open, general statement in opposition to the bill. I prefer, after we dispose of the amendment, to make one more general statement in opposition to the bill, based upon my minority views. Then, I intend to proceed with offering amendments which I shall discuss briefly, and then proceed with the business of disposing of the bill. I shall not enter into an agreement on this amendment, because, as the Senator from Montana knows, if we cannot vote on this amendment tonight, I prefer not to have a vote on it before Wednesday. I might even give some consideration—after the case pro and the case con are made—to withdrawing the amendment temporarily; but I have no objection to having the Senate vote on this amendment tonight.

I shall summarize the amendment as follows: It would give the President, out of military aid funds, the \$89 million, earmarked for southeast Asia; the amendment would not give him an additional \$89 million for the foreign aid bill. The bill already includes millions of dollars more than should be in it. The President can transfer funds in the way this amendment proposes, so that he can spend \$89 million for the specific purpose he wants to spend it for; namely, for economic assistance in

southeast Asia. However, I do not believe there is any justification for the President's using the Vietnam war as the vehicle for having the bill include an additional \$89 million.

At this stage, I believe that the transfer procedure provided by my amendment is preferable. It shows our good faith insofar as the President is concerned. It gives him an opportunity to see what he can do with the economic approach.

However, the Senator from Alaska has said that we have not had hearings on it or have not had an opportunity to see whether it is feasible to spend any of it in the midst of a war in South Vietnam, in respect to seeing what can be accomplished with it.

But I shall offer this amendment first. I make perfectly clear that my offering of the amendment does not mean I do not think the bill should be cut. Later, I shall offer my major amendment to cut the entire bill by \$500 million. There is nothing inconsistent between this amendment and my announced plan to offer an amendment to cut the bill by \$500 million.

However, for the time being, I yield the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, what did the Senator from Oregon have in mind with respect to a vote on his amendment?

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. There should be a quorum call. The majority leader should then announce to the Senate that the amendment is pending and that I have made my case in chief on it.

The only comments I shall make now will be in reply to the remarks of any Senators who may oppose my amendment; and then I shall be ready to have the vote taken.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask the question because I have been requested by the chairman of the committee, the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright], to offer an amendment as a substitute for the amendment proposed by the Senator from Oregon. The reason why the Senator from Arkansas is not in the Chamber at this time, so as to be able to offer, himself, this amendment is that the Senator from Arkansas is temporarily detained in Dr. Calver's office.

Would the same forecast of a vote by the Senator from Oregon be applicable to the substitute being offered?

Mr. MORSE. I would not "buy that pig in a poke" until I hear what the substitute is.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The substitute is the committee action, which, in effect is based on the special message, and would add an additional \$89 million, as requested by the President.

Mr. MORSE. Then I shall oppose that amendment; but I shall not speak at any great length against it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand that; and I appreciate the suggestion made. I was wondering whether, on the basis of his original suggestion, it would be possible, after allowing a certain

length of time for explanation, to take the vote this evening.

Mr. MORSE. I hope so, for I favor getting on with our work.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Would the Senator suggest how much time he thinks he would require before reaching the yeas-and-nays vote.

Mr. MORSE. I would favor letting Senators discuss the amendment, and then vote.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Very well.

Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright], I offer to the amendment of the Senator from Oregon a substitute amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment to the amendment of the Senator from Oregon will be read.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. It is proposed to strike out, on page 4, lines 15 through 17, and to insert in lieu thereof the following:

(2) Strike out "\$215,000,000 which", and Substitute "\$218,000,000 for use beginning in the fiscal year 1966 and \$210,000,000 for use beginning in the fiscal year 1967, which sums".

On page 10, strike out lines 14 through 19, and insert in lieu thereof the following:

(a) In the first sentence, strike out "for use beginning in the fiscal year 1965".

(b) In the first sentence, strike out "\$405,000,000 which" and substitute "430,000,000 for use beginning in the fiscal year 1966 and \$350,000,000 for use beginning in the fiscal year 1967 which sums".

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record a statement made by Hon. Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, before the Foreign Relations Committee, on June 3, 1965.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, JUNE 3, 1965

Mr. Chairman, we appreciate this committee's prompt consideration of the President's request for increased economic assistance funds for southeast Asia. I regret that it was not possible to quantify these additional fiscal year 1966 requirements during the committee's regular consideration of the Foreign Assistance Act.

The President, in his message to the Congress on Tuesday, put the purpose of our presence in Vietnam succinctly when he said:

"We are defending the right of the people of South Vietnam to decide their own destiny. Where this right is attacked by force, we have no alternative but to reply with strength. But military action is not a final solution in this area; it is only a partial means to a much larger goal. Freedom and progress will be possible in Vietnam only as the people are assured that history is on their side—that it will give them a chance to make a living in peace, to educate their children, to escape the ravages of disease and, above all, to be free of the oppressors who for so long have fed on their labors."

"Our effort on behalf of the people of southeast Asia should unite, not divide, the people of that region. Our policy is not to spread conflict but to heal conflict."

The President's current request is for funds required to serve this purpose, at this juncture, in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.

June 7, 1965

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Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500320023-0

In the President's statement on Vietnam on March 25, and again in his historic address at Johns Hopkins University, on April 7, the President invited Asia to respond to his offer of a U.S. role in meeting the basic human needs of the peoples of southeast Asia. The Secretary General of the United Nations and his colleagues in New York, Bangkok, and elsewhere have taken up his invitation to explore institutional and program possibilities. We are gratified that the Asian governments, and notably the Government of Japan, have commenced the study of means to improve the welfare of the peoples of southeast Asia. The greatest contribution to this goal would be, of course, to end violence and to relieve peoples of the burdens they bear today for support of military organizations and operations. But we cannot await tranquillity in the area to begin needed expanded processes of social and economic development. And so we must begin and chart a course which permits those whose ideas and political systems may differ amongst themselves all to participate either as beneficiaries or as donors. Happily the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East is an institution which benefits from the leadership of the United Nations Secretariat in New York and is currently led by a dedicated group of international servants. To it already belong most of the countries of Asia and the Far East, and adherence of others should not present great difficulties.

We would like to hold open the possibility that a peaceful North Vietnam might share in the benefits that would come from peace itself and also from participation in such multilateral institutions and programs as appear to meet the common need for economic and social development.

The magnificent successes of the Marshall plan in Europe grew from a simple unelaborated idea which took account of political, economic, and security realities. The Marshall plan was not imposed upon Europe. We do not intend to impose a U.S. plan on Asia. However, the President has given us the concept. Both within the Government of the United States and within governments and multilateral institutions elsewhere plans and possibilities are being explored for fulfilling a noble goal.

The President has requested an increase of \$80 million in the authorization for supporting assistance and \$9 million for technical cooperation, all for expanded programs of economic assistance in southeast Asia. Two basic and urgent purposes would be served:

1. These funds would permit the first concrete action in carrying out the President's April 7 proposal to launch an intensified, international campaign to stimulate southeast Asian economic and social progress and promote closer regional economic cooperation. This request and the congressional response to it should, we believe, demonstrate to other prosperous nations and the southeast Asian countries that we are ready to do our part if they do theirs. As Asian institutions and plans are developed, we will prepare for submission to Congress next January, a more complete presentation of requirements for this special effort. When the necessary steps have been taken with respect to the projected Asian Development Bank, we plan to ask for funds to make a U.S. contribution through appropriate legislative channels.

2. These funds also would enable South Vietnam to undertake expansion of industrial production and investment, increased low-cost housing construction, transportation and other public works improvements while carrying out an expanded defense effort.

The expanded development program from southeast Asia will require larger contributions through multilateral arrangements, both existing and newly established, as well

as increased bilateral assistance. The former will include funds fully administered by international bodies—such as the expected U.N.-sponsored consortium for the Nam Ngum Dam in Laos and the proposed Asian Development Bank—as well as funds for projects planned and coordinated by regional agencies but implemented as national projects. Excluded from what we describe as the expanded development effort are our police assistance programs and the large commodity import programs required to sustain the military efforts of weak economies.

In this message to the Congress submitting the foreign assistance proposals last January, the President pointed out that the minimum budget proposed did not allow for major increases which might be required during the year. "If they should arise, he said, 'I shall not hesitate to inform the Congress and request additional funds.' Anticipating increases in South Vietnam's requirements for economic or military assistance, he asked for a special standby authorization for additional appropriations for our assistance to Vietnam only.

The House of Representatives decided to broaden the proposed standby authorization to cover all southeast Asia. This committee preferred to reserve any further authorization pending specific requests and hearings.

In the past 2 weeks, the size of the additional bilateral U.S. economic aid requirements in Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos has become clearer.

At the same time, it has become evident that our broader purpose of stimulating regional economic cooperation requires prompt action on available multinational projects, without waiting for a complete set of regional institutions to emerge. We propose, therefore, to commit approximately \$19 million to Mekong Basin projects early in fiscal year 1966 if feasibility reviews now under way prove favorable and other conditions are met.

The Mekong water resource projects include:

The Nam Ngum Dam in Laos, serving both Laos and northern Thailand: \$13.5 million. The first stage of this 20,000 kilowatt power project on a Mekong tributary is estimated to cost about \$27 million. The Mekong Committee has asked the World Bank to managed construction, using funds granted by the United States and other advanced countries. Subject to a finding of economic and financial feasibility, we propose to commit the United States to a grant of half of the total cost, provided other countries contribute the balance in grant funds.

A power transmission line linking Vientiane, Laos, and Nongkhal, Thailand, across the Mekong River. Ancillary to this would be an expansion of distribution lines in the Vientiane area. Cost estimate: \$500,000.

Phase II engineering studies of the proposed Pa Mong Dam, a very large Mekong main stream project between Laos and Northeast Thailand: \$4.5 million in fiscal year 1966 technical cooperation funds. Continuation of a long-term study by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation of this major project of the basin development scheme was dropped from the initial fiscal year 1966 AID presentation because of uncertainty as to the findings of the first phase study on irrigation demand. We are now informed that the Bureau of Reclamation team will recommend going ahead with the engineering reconnaissance, including aerial mapping, site testing, and canal alignment.

Feasibility studies of irrigation dam projects on the Mun and Chi Rivers in northeast Thailand. Acceleration of this work, also by the Bureau of Reclamation, will require an increase of at least \$500,000 in technical cooperation funds above previous estimates.

Nothing is more fundamental to progress in southeast Asia than improved health serv-

ices. The severe shortage of doctors and other health services in the rural areas of Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand has long been a major concern of their Governments, and of AID. We propose to intensify our assistance by: Providing additional medical and surgical teams, both military and civilian, to serve sick and injured civilians in provincial and other rural towns of South Vietnam; broadening our assistance to rural public health programs in Thailand, particularly in provision of equipment to provincial hospitals, health centers, and drug distribution agents; and rehabilitating or better equipping rural dispensaries in Laos, supplementing our present extensive health and sanitation program which now provides pharmaceuticals and more than 100 Philippine doctors and nurses who train Lao medics and care for the sick throughout the country.

These additional efforts will require additional supporting assistance, largely in Vietnam, and additional technical cooperation funds, largely in Thailand.

The third field of expanded assistance to the people of southeast Asia is the training and equipping of local engineering and public works agencies for rural development work—simple roads, water wells, irrigation ponds, schools, etc.

We propose expansion of previously planned projects of this sort in northeast Thailand and, for the first time, in the southernmost provinces of Thailand. In Laos, we propose to expand the existing program of training and equipping the highway department staff by applying an on-the-job training approach to the rehabilitation of the road from Vientiane to Luang Prabang.

Rural electrification cooperatives have played an important role in the development of the United States and other countries. In cooperation with the U.S. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, we propose to help the people of three selected areas of South Vietnam establish electric coops. We hope these pilot projects will become models for bringing light and power for the homes and small industries of southeast Asia within reach of their incomes. This represents \$5.5 million of the supporting assistance increase requested.

Expanded technical assistance to Lao agricultural development, particularly agricultural credit and marketing, and the introduction on a wider scale of improved livestock and seeds are proposed.

Industrial expansion in Vietnam, both now and immediately after the cessation of hostilities, will be essential to the country's rehabilitation and progress toward self-support. Without waiting for peace, we propose to contract with potential private American investors and other expert groups to conduct feasibility studies looking to the establishment of new plants, in such lines of production as fertilizer, cement and kraft paper. Related public works, particularly port development, also will require additional funds for feasibility studies.

The largest element of the supplemental request is for \$45 million in additional supporting assistance to finance Vietnam's commercial imports. In testimony before the congressional committees this spring, we have pointed to the necessity of using a then undetermined amount of the proposed standby authorization for this purpose. In the past 2 weeks, we have been able to refine somewhat our calculations of the impact of increased defense and police budgets and expanded public works and investment programs on the demand for imported goods. We now estimate that in addition to the commodity import support previously programmed for basic support of the economy, about \$45 million will be required to maintain economic growth and avoid destructive inflation.

This increased dependence on our aid results partly from Vietcong interdiction of

Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500320023-0

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Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500320023-0

rice shipments, rail and road sabotage and terrorism—all combining to prevent any rice export earnings in 1965.

In the eight northern coastal provinces of Vietnam alone, some 215,000 refugees have fled their homes because of Vietcong terror, 9,000 in just the past week. This mass movement of people requires more construction materials, medicines, and food, not to mention the other economic and social consequences of such mass uprootings.

In addition to these war-connected requirements, there is a growing need for investment in urban and rural areas as a demonstration of the government's determination to emerge from this conflict a viable country, dedicated to the long-run task of nation building.

At the same time, further expansion of the Vietnamese armed forces and police and of security forces construction has expanded the demand for goods in the marketplace.

To meet these requirements for basic economic support, we proposed last January in the fiscal 1966 budget now before the Congress, supporting assistance plus such additional amounts later found to be required to support a higher but then undetermined level of Vietnamese military and civil operations. After taking into account currently available estimates of Vietnamese foreign exchange requirements and earnings, including receipts from U.S. military forces in Vietnam, we now see a probable shortfall of \$40 to \$50 million. This request would cover a midpoint in that range of estimates. These funds would finance imports of a variety of goods such as construction materials, pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, pesticides, tires and tubes, and trucks.

We hope, Mr. Chairman, that these programs will meet the approval of the committee and that you will add the request to the pending authorization bill.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, an explanation has been made by the distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] of the proposed additional \$89 million. The Senator from Oregon made that explanation in explaining his position on the Presidential request. I do not feel that I should go into greater detail than he has gone, because he has covered the situation succinctly and to the point, and the issue is clear.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the substitute amendment offered to the amendment of the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, on this question, I wish to have the yeas and nays ordered.

The issue is clearly drawn. My amendment would authorize the President to spend the \$89 million out of the military aid authorization of the bill he sent here, which the committee voted to place before the Senate. The substitute amendment would add another \$89 million to the President's foreign aid program. The President uses the Vietnam issue—which has a great emotional appeal—as the springboard for firing that missile. However, he does not need it; he does not need to have Congress add \$89 million to the bill. It is one thing to authorize him to spend it for this purpose—which I am glad to vote to do; but it is quite another thing for Congress to say to him, "You can have \$89 million more," when we know we have ahead of us a long debate in connection with the elimination of the unconscionable amounts of waste embedded in the President's \$3,380 million proposal.

So all the chairman of the committee has done is to propose that Congress say, "Mr. President, we will give you \$89 million more." I am opposed to that. I suggest that the sensible thing for us to do at this stage is to say to the President, "If you want to spend for this purpose \$89 million of the amount of money you have asked for in the bill, which the Foreign Relations Committee recommends authorizing you to do, we are not going to oppose your spending it for that purpose; but in order to do it, you will have to transfer \$89 million from military funds into your technical assistance and supporting assistance program."

That is the issue.

If the majority leader does not object, I suggest the absence of a quorum, in order to obtain a yeas and nays vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURDICK in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I withdraw the proposed amendment to the Morse amendment. I am advised that it is not in order as a substitute for the Morse amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be withdrawn.

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